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A B S T R A C T
In organizations, users’ compliance with information security policies (ISP) is crucial for mini-
mizing information security (IS) incidents. To improve users’ compliance, IS managers have
implemented IS awareness (ISA) programs, which are systematically planned interven-
tions to continuously transport security information to a target audience. The underlying
research analyzes IS managers’ efforts to design effective ISA programs by comparing current
design recommendations suggested by scientific literature with actual design practices of
ISA programs in three banks. Moreover, this study addresses how users perceive ISA pro-
grams and related implications for compliant IS behavior. Empirically, we utilize a multiple
case design to investigate three banks from Central and Eastern Europe. In total, 33 semi-
structured interviews with IS managers and users were conducted and internal materials
of ISA programs such as intranet messages and posters were also considered. The paper
contributes to IS compliance research by offering a comparative and holistic view on ISA
program design practices. Moreover, we identified influences on users’ perceptions center-
ing on IS risks, responsibilities, ISP importance and knowledge, and neutralization behaviors.
Finally, the study raises propositions regarding the relationship of ISA program designs and
factors, which are likely to influence users’ ISP compliance.
© 2017 The Authors. Published by Elsevier Ltd. This is an open access article under the
CC BY license (http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/).
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1. Introduction
Banks have been in desperate need of improving information
security (IS) for decades (Baskerville et al., 2014; Goel and
Shawky, 2009; Kjaerland, 2005).They operate in a complex, regu-
lated and rapidly evolving global environment in which
constantly changing or new emerging technologies are needed
for conducting their operations (Goldstein et al., 2011). At the
same time, financial service institutions are prime targets for
crime and fraud (Norton and Walker, 2014). As a result they
are increasingly threatened by data- and function-related IS
risks leading to growing level of IS breaches worldwide
(ORX, 2014; PricewaterhouseCoopers, 2014). There is also an
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uninterrupted flow of media reports about IS breaches in banks
on a global level. Only recently, more than 3.2 million debit cards
issued by Indian banks were compromised (Shukla and Bhakta,
2016). The Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) re-
ported to US Congress about five major bank related incidents
each involving more than 10,000 data records, and previously
an incident caused by a departing employee accidentally breach-
ing the data of roughly 44,000 FDIC customers (Davidson, 2016).
Bank regulators have realized that much is at stake for banks
and that professional management of IS is crucial to cope with
IS risks (Hsu et al., 2013). Since the international banking regu-
lation Basel II was enacted in Europe in 2004, measurement
and quantification of operational risk, which consists of risks
resulting from processes, people, and systems, is mandatory
for banks (Luthy and Forcht, 2006). Particular emphasis is drawn
on data and function related IT operational risk (Goldstein et al.,
2011). Banks have to cover these risks by forming reserves ac-
cording to the measurement approaches of operational risk
(Jobst, 2007). Banks use amongst others the advanced mea-
surement approach to calculate risk, which is based on previous
loss data of the bank (Jobst, 2007).To reduce their obliged capital
reserves banks are therefore interested in minimizing IS in-
cidents in addition to avoiding reputational damage (Gillet et al.,
2010). Accordingly, most prior research on IS and compliance
in the context of banks has considered Basel II as the refer-
ence regulatory framework (Bauer, 2012). Other regulations,
however, introduce similar requirements in terms of mitigat-
ing risks by reducing IS incidents. European (re-)insurance
companies, for example, need to respond to solvency regula-
tion (EU, 2009).The broader Sarbanes Oxley Act (SOX) also aims
at IS to ensure reliable financial reports and protect share-
holders from corporate fraud (US-Congress, 2002). It triggered
a wave of worldwide adaptations and derivations of SOX with
similar compliance requirements, e.g., the European version
publicly known as EUROSOX (EU, 2006).
Besides technology, human behavior is generally seen as the
biggest threat for IS (Crossler et al., 2013; Lebek et al., 2014). Users
regularly cause IS incidents by volitional or non-volitional risk-
taking behavior, such as careless information handling, surfing
on unsecure webpages, thoughtless usage of mobile devices, or
unsecure data practices (Siponen and Vance, 2010; Stanton et al.,
2005). Risk-taking behavior can open further possibilities to harm
the bank for internal malicious coworkers or external perpe-
trators (Guo, 2013). Malicious behavior and fraud, such as theft
of confidential data, can be enabled by a toxic combination of
risky behaviors of the staff (Warkentin and Willison, 2009). During
the last decade, banks started to implement preventive con-
trols such as information security policies (ISP), which introduce
a binding standard concerning IS behaviors among all users, to
reduce IS related loss incidents (Höne and Eloff, 2002). IS poli-
cies outline specific security requirements, but they do not work
alone (Warkentin and Willison, 2009). Hence, organizations con-
centrate on fostering employee information security awareness
(ISA), which is defined as “a state where users in an organiza-
tion are aware of their security mission” (Siponen, 2000, p. 31).
ISA is a long-standing challenge (Goodhue and Straub, 1991) and
technology innovations make it harder for users to stay up to
date about related new IS threats (Baskerville et al., 2014). Struc-
tured ISA programs are used by organizations to educate the
employees about IS risks and how to behave to comply with the
ISP (Johnson, 2006). Accordingly, such ISA programs comprise
systematically planned ISA interventions, which aim to con-
tinuously transport security information to a target audience
(Siponen, 2000). These ISA interventions may include intranet
messages, posters, printed cups, or e-learning tutorials to in-
crease users’ ISA and to reduce volitional and non-volitional risk-
taking behavior. Prior research has shown that ISA can lead to
improved IS behavior and ISP compliance (Bauer and Bernroider,
2017; Bulgurcu et al., 2010; Eminag˘aog˘lu et al., 2009), e.g., an in-
creased protection of confidential information (Thomson and
von Solms, 1998). So far, scholarly literature has discussed mostly
single and neglected multi-layered ISA program designs (Kajzer
et al., 2014; Shaw et al., 2009).
This study aims to address the challenge of IS manage-
ment in banks to design ISA programs, and explores how users
perceive program designs embedded in organization settings.
Hence, we asked the following questions: How does IS man-
agement in banks design ISA programs and how such programs
and their effects are perceived by users in the respective context?
To answer these questions, we first draw on literature high-
lighting current design practices of ISA programs and several
design recommendations, and how users view compliance
related to the ISP. Second, a case study design, illustrating three
cases, is used to present experiences of IS managers and users
as to how ISP compliance is enhanced and how ISA program
designs are perceived reflecting on ISP compliant behaviors. For
this purpose, we analyzed responses from 10 interviews with
IS managers and 23 interviews with users of the three banks.
We differentiated between two groups of employees based on
the rational that those groups’ views on IS experiences differ.
First, IS managers who manage IS or IT and, second, users who
work in any business function of the respective bank. For the
latter, our explorative approach focuses on individual percep-
tions of users centering on IS risks, their (roles) responsibilities,
and how they emphasize ISP importance and knowledge, and
potential non-compliant behaviors. Finally, we consolidate the
results by raising propositions regarding the relationships of ISA
program designs and factors which are likely to influence users’
ISP compliance. In addition, the case study findings highlight
the need to focus on greater attention on context sensitive
designs of such programs utilizing past experiences.
The remainder of the paper is structured as follows. First,
we briefly summarize previous research on the efforts of IS
managers to establish IS with a focus on ISA programs and em-
ployees’ views on IS and ISP compliance. Second, we introduce
the research methodology and process of empirical fieldwork
followed by the main results of the study. Next, we provide an
in-depth discussion of the results and raise propositions for
further research. Finally, we conclude the paper by summa-
rizing the main findings and directions for further research.
2. Conceptual background
2.1. ISA programs and their designs
Over the last two decades, ISA programs have received in-
creasing attention from both academics and practitioners. IS
management has traditionally emphasized formalized rule
structures against the background of a narrow technical
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viewpoint to establish IS (Dhillon and Backhouse, 2001). In this
view, prior research focused on formal controls implemented
by policies, procedures or tools (Merete Hagen et al., 2008). From
the late 1990s to the mid-2000s, work on ISA building and pro-
grams has increasingly utilized the socio-organizational
perspective and was mainly conceptional in trying to under-
stand how IS can be improved by increasing ISA. Initially, ISA
programs were found to be deterrent countermeasures (Straub
and Welke, 1998) and positioned to require a systematic plan-
ning approach (Puhakainen and Siponen, 2010; Siponen, 2000).
In this stream prior research often applied the Deming cycle,
e.g. relating to plan, do, check, act (PDCA) cycle models to vi-
sualize the continuous need of ISA building (Wilson and Hash,
2003). Users’ achieved ISA is a temporal state of mind, which
has to be renewed periodically (Warkentin et al., 2012; Wilson
and Hash, 2003). Besides, IS risks are changing fast, and new
technologies are challenging for users; hence, users have to be
reminded often to stay aware (Clarke et al., 2012). Yet, orga-
nizations still seem to rely too much on formal methods, which
are less resource demanding than ISA programs (Merete Hagen
et al., 2008). Contemporary IS research asks for more bal-
anced and holistic approaches (Tsohou et al., 2015).
While the importance of ISA for compliant IS behavior has
now been clearly established (Bauer and Bernroider, 2015, 2017;
Merete Hagen et al., 2008; Silic and Back, 2014; Siponen et al.,
2014), there seems to be no commonly accepted agreement
about how to effectively design ISA programs (Karjalainen et al.,
2013). Prior literature offers several ISA program design rec-
ommendations and mixed results about the effectiveness of
these approaches (Albrechtsen, 2007; Eminag˘aog˘lu et al., 2009).
Effectiveness refers to the ability of the ISA programs to in-
crease individual ISA and improve users’ ISP compliance.
However, we assume that the contrary findings concerning ISA
programs are likely due to the design diversity of the imple-
mented ISA program in banks (Bauer et al., 2013; Shaw et al.,
2009). Hence, we will proceed discussing recommendations for
ISA programs focusing on the aspects of how ISA programs are
structured and how stakeholders communicate ISA designs (see
Table 1).
Previous studies take several perspectives to explain a lack
of understanding on how ISA programs are communicated.
Some studies identify language barriers that seem to play an
important role among users (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009;
Clarke et al., 2012; Peltier, 2005). Other recent studies identify
specific personality types which diverge in their receptive-
ness of a specific kind of IS message and/or communication
channel (Johnston et al., 2016; Kajzer et al., 2014) and recom-
mend personality sensitive approaches to avoid ineffectiveness
of initially proposed classic “one to many” mass communica-
tion (Kajzer et al., 2014). Literature on experiential learning
approaches promote user involvement using several tech-
niques to enforce a two-way communication on IS (Albrechtsen
and Hovden, 2010; Clarke et al., 2012; Spears and Barki, 2010).
For example, feedback interventions can be used to emotion-
ally involve users and can lead to a two-way communication
about IS (Eminag˘aog˘lu et al., 2009). Building on learning theo-
ries, users’ engagement can be enhanced by utilizing role
models and role plays, which may lead to an increased users’
identification with ISA programs and greater emotional in-
volvement (Karjalainen et al., 2013).
Generally, studies that follow a diversified approach build
on the main assumption that the way how users reflect on IS
risks has an impact on their ISP compliance (Albrechtsen and
Hovden, 2010). Overall, several ways can be employed to tackle
ISA through communication aspects to finally improve users’
compliant IS behavior.
Beyond the communication of ISA programs, there are also
structural components that affect the effectiveness of their
implementation. First, an iterative management cycle to ensure
continuous improvements, such as the plan-do-check-act
Table 1 – Consideration of design recommendations of ISA programs from literature.
Categories Short description References
Structure of ISA programs
Media richness in ISA
interventions
Refers to the utilization of diverse media material such as text or multimedia
material, and the structure of the emergence of these materials. The richest
medium is human telling the user about the IS issues.
(Abawajy, 2014;
Shaw et al., 2009)
Customizing ISA
interventions
Refers to customization of single components of an ISA program. Customization
may apply to content, design and communication as well as to ISA
interventions themselves. It is recommended to distinguish between cultures
and countries.
(Ding et al., 2015;
Karjalainen et al., 2013;
Tsohou et al., 2015)
Implementation of an
iterative control and
improvement process
Refers to strategically planning and executing ISA programs by applying a
staged and cyclic management process to ensure continuous quality
improvements, such as the PDCA (Plan, Do, Check, Act) / Deming cycle.
(Disterer, 2013;
Singh et al., 2013;
Wilson and Hash, 2003)
Communication of ISA programs
Non-technocratic IS risk and
threat communication
Refers to IS managers’ usage of a too technocratic language for ISA program
interventions.
(Clarke et al., 2012;
Peltier, 2005)
Message–person matching
(personality)
Refers to the finding that users of a specific personality type are receptive to a
specific kind of message or communication channel.
(Johnston et al., 2016;
Kajzer et al., 2014)
Feedback interventions Refer to a two-way communication enabled by IS managers which might be
used to emotionally involve users through ISA program interventions.
(Eminag˘aog˘lu et al., 2009)
Enforcement of reflection
and dialogue
Refers to users’ reflection of IS risks, either by a group or individually, which is
reported to have a high impact on users’ ISP compliance.
(Albrechtsen and
Hovden, 2010)
Use of a role play (positive
and negative)
Refers to users’ identification with positive and negative characters in ISA
programs. This identification might result in more emotional involvement.
(Karjalainen et al., 2013)
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(PDCA) cycle, is relevant (Disterer, 2013; Wilson and Hash, 2003).
Such a model should in particular include a planning, an ex-
ecution, an evaluation and an action stage on an ongoing
iterative basis (Rantos et al., 2012). Further, media richness of
the information channels is vital, because different kinds of
learners perform better depending on media material such as
text or multimedia material, and the structure of the emer-
gence of these materials (Abawajy, 2014; Shaw et al., 2009). Last,
but not least, customizing ISA interventions is recommended.
One general template of an ISA program is unlikely to fit all
divisions or units of an organization because of likely cul-
tural differences in particular between countries and regions
(Ding et al., 2015; Karjalainen et al., 2013).
2.2. Employees’ views on ISP compliance
Despite the importance of an ISP for IS (Bauer and Bernroider,
2017; Lebek et al., 2014), users regularly neglect to act accord-
ing to their organizational ISP (Siponen, 2000), and current
research offers a range of different explanations (Albrechtsen,
2007; Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009; Posey et al., 2014). The
perception of IS risks plays a significant role for acting com-
pliant with banks’ ISP (Albrechtsen, 2007). IS manager tend to
believe that unintentional ISP non-compliance of users is the
greatest cause for IS incidents. In contrast, users regularly
believe that external threats from hackers and the internet are
the biggest IS risks, and do not see themselves as threats (Posey
et al., 2014). Previous research highlights that most users do
not understand and recognize significant IS risks, such as pass-
word misuse (Florencio and Herley, 2007; Horcher and Tejay,
2009). It is even less likely that users can estimate possible
adverse impacts (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009; Posey et al.,
2014). As a consequence, IS managers tend to blame users for
not taking IS seriously enough and for generally underesti-
mating the importance of IS for the organization (Albrechtsen
and Hovden, 2009).
Another explanation for employee non-compliance is that
people may lack the knowledge of the existence of the ISP and
its content, which naturally is a pre-condition for ISP compli-
ance (Wright, 2008). Previous research found that users’ levels
of ISP knowledge affect users’ intentions to comply with ISP
(Bauer and Bernroider, 2017; Pahnila et al., 2013). Uninten-
tional violations of the ISP might result from users simply
ignoring the existence of the ISP or users not caring or under-
standing the content of the ISP. Users and IS managers have
different responsibilities concerning IS, which complicates man-
aging ISP compliance. For users, who have to perform in their
job mainly as a marketing assistant or bank counter em-
ployee, IS is most likely only a necessary secondary issue, which
in turn may lead to justifying non-compliance, e.g., with work
pressures (Barlow et al., 2013; Bauer and Bernroider, 2014). In
principle, employees may use neutralization techniques to
justify intentional ISP violations. Apart from time and work pres-
sures, neutralization techniques can be related to perceived
unjust rules, and the mentioned poor understanding of risks
and possible threats (Siponen and Vance, 2010). The original
theory was developed decades ago and focused on five tech-
niques of neutralization (Sykes and Matza, 1957). Interestingly,
Barlow et al. (2013) reported that certain techniques of neu-
tralization are more powerful than others depending on the
research context (e.g. defense of necessity for password secu-
rity). In contrast, IS managers’ primary role in their job is to
ensure IS in the organization (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009,
2010) and work against these potential neutralizing behav-
iors. This study will explore tensions between groups of
organizational members and implications for designing effec-
tive ISA programs.
3. Research methods
3.1. Research approach
We utilized a qualitative research design in three organiza-
tions in the banking sector utilizing different approaches to
design and operate ISA programs. The organizations in the
banking sector provided a relevant context for our research aims
as those organizations are challenged by IS through internal
and external pressures (e.g. Hsu et al., 2013; Goldstein et al.,
2011).
In order to capture the phenomenon on IS within organi-
zations we utilize a multiple case study design (Cavaye, 1996;
Yin, 2014), utilizing data triangulation (Patton, 2002). Each or-
ganizational setting acts as a distinct bounded case.Furthermore,
each organization is considered as an embedded case involv-
ing more than one unit of analysis (i.e. it relates to more than
one branch and more than one individual user). We are par-
ticularly interested in a contrasting case study design (Eisenhardt,
1989; Stake, 2005) as it illuminates the distinct design ap-
proaches of ISA programs as well as diverse factors influencing
ISP compliance in each organizational setting. In detail, each
research case consists of interviews of bank branch as well as
headquarters users, IS managers, and ISA program materials.
This approach is suitable, as the interest of this study is not
focused on one particular user but on how users’ narratives
reflect on ISP compliance and on design recommendations of
ISA programs specifics. We develop propositions to enhance
our understanding of ISP compliance and design recommen-
dations for ISA programs (Eisenhardt, 1989).
3.2. Data collection
Our data collection followed three phases. First, informed by
the literature review, we initiated a workshop in 2013 includ-
ing focus groups to obtain a deeper understanding of IS and
ISP compliance in the context of banking. This helped us to
gain access to potential research partners within the organi-
zation. Second, we conducted 33 semi-structured interviews
with IT professionals and users and analyzed ISA program ma-
terials such as intranet messages or leaflets (see stages
exemplified in Fig. 1). The first stage of qualitative fieldwork
was carried out from March to April 2013. We thereby gained
deeper insights into the design and implementation of ISA pro-
grams. Building on those insights we conducted our semi-
structured interviews with users of the three case banks from
September 2013 to June 2014 (see Fig. 1 illustrates the re-
search progress and stages).
Our sample comprises organizational members carrying
out different roles, as indicated in Table A1. In total 33 interviews
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were conducted with two groups of employees over two
stages: 23 interviews with users, and 10 interviews with IS
managers. As a result of our sampling strategy, interviewees
were contacted according to their different roles they hold
in the organizations (Myers and Newman, 2007), specifically
we focused on two groups of employees: (1) IS managers:
employees who design the ISA program. This includes IT
security managers. Normally, they are not part of general
management. (2) Users: employees, working in any business
function, but not related to IS or IT. We recruited inter-
view participants through several contacts within the respec-
tive banks, specifically through risk managers and their
existing networks. Participants were contacted by email and
assured of the research project’s independence from the
organization.
All interviews have been conducted in English, except the
interviews in Gamma bank, which have been carried out in
German. Each interview lasted between 30 and 40 minutes, was
audio recorded with participants’ prior consent, fully tran-
scribed and anonymized (Sarker et al., 2013). Building on insights
from our focus groups, during the first phase of investiga-
tion, we developed an interview guide including open-ended
questions regarding information security in the respective bank.
We started interviews by asking participants about their spe-
cific role in the bank, how they perceive information security
risks within their bank, how they perceived the banks ISA
programs.
3.3. Data analysis
In a first step, we explored narrative themes in our 33 inter-
view transcripts. We read through the transcripts separately,
aiming to capture the specific themes reviewing people’s ac-
counts as a “whole” while using N-Vivo to develop an initial
coding structure. Building on these initial main categories, we
continued to code across all interviews, developing main cat-
egories using content analysis (Huberman and Miles, 1994;
Mayring, 2003). After coding, the researchers met again dis-
cussing the main categories and mutually validating the codes,
internally and externally (Yin, 2014). Sequentially, our re-
search strongly builds on an iterative process relying on data
and conceptual insights from the literature for formulating
propositions which reflects a deductive and inductive ap-
proach, integrating theoretical insights and emerging themes
from our interview data.
4. Findings
Building on the following case descriptions, we discuss our main
results in the subsections below. First, we start with an over-
view of the cases including the chosen ISA program approaches.
Second, we present which ISA program designs are consid-
ered by the case banks. Third, employee groups and their
problematic behaviors are described. Finally, factors influenc-
ing users’ ISP compliance are analyzed in the three banks.
4.1. Case overview
The case study looked at three banks operating in Central
Eastern Europe (CEE). All three institutions offer full-service in-
cluding commercial banking (e.g. savings accounts and granting
loans), investment banking (e.g. wealth and asset manage-
ment) and other services (e.g. insurances). Since Basel II became
effective, they set up units for operational risk to manage risks
related to humans, processes, and information systems. Struc-
turally, banks constituted IS departments responsible for ISA
programs.
All three banks have some practices and established pro-
cesses regarding IS in common. In terms of employee induction,
for example, new employees have to complete a one-day train-
ing. The training includes compliance in particular related to
IS and the knowledge required to comply with the respective
ISP. Before users are allowed to begin their work and receive
the necessary privileges, they have to sign an acknowledg-
ment and acceptance of the ISP. All banks have also developed
their own data classification by which they categorize their data
based on its level of sensitivity and importance for the bank.
Additionally, all banks have established different annual
e-learning strategies addressing IS. However, the interviewed
IS managers are not satisfied with the impact of e-learning on
the users, who do not take the courses seriously enough, as,
for example, this quotation demonstrates:
People are speaking about the right answers, but only “which
is right? B? Ok thanks”, not about the topic. IS Manager (B2),
Beta bank.
4.1.1. Interaction approach (Alpha bank)
After a phishing attack in 2006, Alpha bank started to plan their
first ISA program and implemented it in 2007. The first ISA
Fig. 1 – Research process.
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program material dealt with the phishing attack and offered
suggestions to users on how to deal with phishing attacks. The
content was distributed via user newspapers and intranet. Since
2007, they conducted an ISA program annually and attempted
to improve it from year to year. Alpha bank has developed ten
IS policy documents focusing on different aspects of IS and has
provided the ISPs on the intranet. In 2013, they conducted a
campaign, which was structured in four weeks with chang-
ing themes every week and changing topics every day of the
week, and with a quiz at the end of every week. This high in-
teraction of users and IS managers fosters user involvement.
The whole campaign is distributed in every branch. Further-
more, a role model, a fictitious employee, is used to deliver the
content of the campaign. The role model character acts non-
compliant, often communicating neutralizing behaviors to
address common justifications of users. The IS managers col-
lected opinions about the usefulness of their ISA program with
a follow up questionnaire. More than 50% said that it was in-
teresting and that they learned many new things.
4.1.2. Incident-related approach (Beta bank)
Beta bank began to conduct their ISA program in 2010.The main
IS communication channel is the intranet, and it is used bi-
weekly to deliver IS messages that are stored also in the intranet
as articles. In these messages, the IS department tries to raise
attention about actual risks gained from media, and they
measure the diffusion of the messages by click rates. Hence,
IS managers conclude that around 50% of all users at least view
a new article. Last year, IS managers developed and imple-
mented fake IS incidents to evaluate compliant behavior of their
users in the headquarters and in branches. Beta bank is keen
on communicating real incidents to the users, and hence their
approach is named “incident-related”. In addition to the focus
on real incidents, Beta bank communicates the rules and
working practices by emphasizing explanations to the users.
4.1.3. Accountability approach (Gamma bank)
Although Gamma bank set up their security department in 2009,
they introduced their first ISA program by conducting monthly
security tips in 2011. The security tips are frequently deliv-
ered through the intranet and saved. Moreover, every
department of the bank has to have a yearly updated printed
security folder, which addresses all necessary security topics,
also including IS. Furthermore, IS managers evaluate compli-
ant behavior with ISP of every branch and every business unit
of Gamma bank once a year through short visits in which actual
IS risks are simulated. Gamma bank set up a company agree-
ment, which includes rights and obligations according to
information technology and information handling, and every
user must sign this company agreement. This proceeding en-
forces responsibility, which is additionally targeted by shifting
security evaluation to line managers. Line managers have a
short training on security topics, and once a year they have
to fill out a “control sheet” in which they must report ISP com-
pliance of users, such as clear desk policy or password. In
addition, the line managers should evaluate access rights of
the single users. Additionally, the bank maintains a blacklist
with names of users who have conducted non-compliant be-
havior regarding ISP. IS managers contacted these users and
explained their mistakes to them.
4.2. Employee groups and IS behaviors
Fig. 2 denotes three different internal employee groups consid-
ered in data analysis.We differentiated between two general user
groups: headquarter and branch users. We realized that both
groups face very different IS risks and behaviors. Headquarter
employees are users working in the general management section
of the banks (e.g. in marketing or project management). Branch
employees are users facing and directly interacting with clients
in branches. These distinctive profiles have strong implica-
tions for IS security behaviors, which should be influenced by
ISA programs designed and run by IS managers.
The risk is that the client manager wants to give the client
the information fast, and the overcrowded daily routine
sometimes… They think that security is just doing the wrong
things. And it’s hard to keep their mind about security. IS
manager (C7), Gamma bank.
Every policy rule cannot be carried out, every time, but I don’t
think the activities are so risky. User (C8), Gamma bank.
The analysis revealed that unintentional and intentional be-
haviors of users are likely to trigger IS incidents from the
perspective of the users themselves as well as from IS man-
agers overseeing their behaviors. Many users reported that co-
workers have non-compliant password habits, have not
implemented clear desk and screen policies, and follow un-
desirable information handling practices, as these responses
show:
Some colleagues do not care about a clear desk or clear
screen. Everything lies everywhere, e.g. on the table. Docu-
ments such as balance sheets, customer information, nearly
everything is unlocked on the table. User (C9), Gamma bank.
Furthermore, IS managers mention that the majority of users
are aware of IS risks, but it seems that many intentionally act
non-compliant with their ISP. According to IS managers, if only
2% of the users are not acting compliant with the ISP, then the
entire bank is highly threatened.
Yes, our employees are aware, but it’s like risky driving on
highway. They think “it can happen to everybody else but
not to me”. Hence, their behavior is not or not always in
accordance with ISP. IS manager (B1), Beta bank.
Fig. 2 – Overview of considered employee groups.
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4.3. Theme 1: ISA program designs
The three banks have inconsistently implemented the design
recommendations and can be classified into three different
levels of coverage (see Table 2). In terms of structural design
recommendations, only Alpha and Beta bank implemented the
full PDCA cycle model, which consists of designing, develop-
ing, implementing, and monitoring an ISA program. In contrast,
Gamma bank has not established an evaluation mechanism
for ISA programs until now. Alpha bank does not only evalu-
ate their ISA program, they also evaluate their users’ behavior
by conducting penetration tests, which include social engi-
neering attacks. No bank has customized their ISA interventions
for specific regions or branches. All banks have utilized media
richness in their ISA programs.
Almost all communicational design recommendations have
been considered by Alpha bank. In contrast, Beta and Gamma
bank did not implement any of the recommendations. Spe-
cifically, several users of Beta and Gamma bank reported that
the content of ISA program was too technocratic in many cases.
I would say for me it [ISA program] is useful, but from time
to time I receive some feedback that it is written too dif-
ficult, that it is written by lawyers, and not by speech of
normal person (common tongue). User (B3), Beta bank.
In contrast, Alpha bank enforced reflection and dialogue
because they query their users extensively with a question-
naire about how well they understood the interventions and
how much they liked them after their ISA campaign.
Sure the campaigns [ISA program] are a good method,
because otherwise we [users] do not care so much about
these kinds of things. Everybody will just do their job, and
not care about information security issues. User (A8), Alpha
bank.
Moreover, Alpha bank promoted active participation of their
users by daily quizzes over one month and achieved a high
number of participants in the quizzes. Beta and Gamma bank
conducted no special measures to tackle users’ involvement.
Further, a role model, which enforces learning by imitation, has
been included by Alpha bank to ensure users’ involvement.
Alpha bank also make use of social engineering penetration
tests, which are defined as a feedback intervention, because
they tackle users’ behavior, and IS managers actively give feed-
back to the users about the adequacy of their behavior. The
message-to-person matching recommendation with regard to
users’ personalities has not been considered in the consid-
ered ISA programs.
The majority of interviewees appreciated the implemented
ISA program and perceived it as useful for their daily work. For
example, Beta banks’ users mentioned that it is valuable for
them that real-life incidents are communicated via the ISA
program. Nevertheless, some users are complaining about the
interventions.
I don’t have a special place for it. It’s only a cost benefit thing,
so you can spend millions on something but still could have
the risk of something happening. User (B8), Beta bank.
Some obstacles are found with intranet messages and
e-mails as ISA interventions. Gamma banks’ users often men-
tioned the high volume of messages arriving in the inbox in
the morning. Current IS information is therefore often over-
looked or receives a low priority compared to other emails.They
also criticized the fact that IS information is sometimes pre-
sented in a complex and incomprehensible way, does not
address the purpose, or is too abstract, as the following quo-
tation shows.
The security tips are a form of self-congratulation of the
security department. They want that everybody is respon-
sible. I do not like that practice. For example, today they
wrote “Keep compliance with ISPs in mind”. What should
I do now? Look up the ISPs in the intranet and then pay
attention? I do not believe that this is useful. It is only for
the conscience of the IS managers. User (C6), Gamma bank.
4.4. Theme 2: ISP compliance
This theme includes the factors influencing ISP compliance
among the banks.
4.4.1. Perception of IS risks
The users of Alpha bank seem to have a much higher level of
IS risk perception in comparison with the two other banks.
Alpha bank users more often connect IS with their daily rou-
tines, as the following statement of a product development
manager show.
An average risk is keeping the bank information secure.This
secure information has to be defended and kept secure.The
main problem for the bank is the data that the bank col-
lects from the clients and stores in the secure server in this
building or a secure data center. And the client needs this
data for their company, and we have to send the clients
Table 2 – Consideration of design recommendations of
ISA programs in cases.
Alpha
bank
Beta
bank
Gamma
bank
Structural design recommendations
Media richness of ISA interventions Yes Yes Yes
Implementation of an iterative
control and improvement process
Yes Yes No
Customizing ISA interventions No No No
Communicational design recommendations
Non-technocratic IS risk and threat
communication
Yes No No
Message–person matching in regard
to users’ personalities
No No No
Enforcement of reflection and
dialogue
Yes No No
Use of role models and role play Yes No No
Feedback interventions Yes No No
Overall coverage level of design
recommendations
High Medium Low
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this data in a secure channel.This is the most difficult thing.
The difficult part is the client wants to collect the data in
a simple form, and the security for the client is not rel-
evant in their daily routine. User (A3), Alpha bank.
Moreover, the investigation showed that different user groups
reported different perceptions of IS risks. Interestingly, there
are some differences between branch and headquarter users
among all banks. For example, branch users seem to be gen-
erally aware of the risk of data leakage and also reported to
be confronted with more and more social engineering attacks.
In contrast, headquarter users see themselves to be not as im-
portant for ensuring IS. They mainly perceive IS risks from
outside the bank (e.g. hackers) and do not regard their own be-
havior as very relevant for IS. It is important to note that also
most headquarter users do not perceive their coworkers as po-
tential malicious perpetrators.
4.4.2. Perception of responsibilities, ISP importance, and
knowledge
The majority of users from all banks mentioned that every-
body in the bank is responsible for IS. In contrast to this
desirable statement, a few users and IS managers, especially
from Beta and Gamma bank, mentioned that for some of their
colleagues, IS does not really matter.
It really depends on the attitude of staff members. The ones
say: Yes that is necessary! The others say: No, leave me alone!
User (C4), Gamma bank.
There are sufficiently enough staff members who do not
care. Honestly. IS manager (C1), Gamma bank.
It is strange, because users tend to talk about problems at
home with their PC, which was infected, etc. I think that
they consider the electronic environment at work as secure,
and take it for granted. They simply think that if we follow
the rules, then it is secure, which is definitely a false feeling,
because even the business environment can be somehow
compromised or attacked or infected. IS manager (B9), Beta
bank.
The reason for the lack of perveived responsibilities among
a few users might be that the importance of IS in banks is not
acknowledged by all users of Beta and Gamma bank. Users of
both banks reported that they do not understand why secu-
rity efforts, such as password security procedures, are important.
Passwords are an infinite theme, I personally hate this issue.
With our new rules for passwords, a minimum of 8 char-
acters, Capital letters, numbers…. and you are not allowed
to use the last 5 passwords. It is a very exhausting issue.
And it doesn’t matter if you log in on your computer or if
you want to have access to the internet you always need
your password. User (C11), Gamma bank.
Astoundingly, some IS managers of Beta bank seem to take
also not every ISP for granted (e.g. secure internet use is seen
to be not as important for ensuring IS). Further, the IS manager
questions if technological safeguards are effective IS controls.
I do not bother, as a security guy, if someone is watching
naked girls or men on web pages in his office time, as long
as he delivers his duty. That is a question for his manager
to give him a proper measure of time. From my perspec-
tive, maybe those pages might be infected, but that is an
annoyance, but not a real danger. If you try to block some
of those pages, the only thing you do is you promote the
creativity of the people to get there. They see it as a chal-
lenge, and that is the most dangerous thing you can
encounter. IS Manager (B9), Beta bank.
Another explanation for the lack in perceived responsibili-
ties could be missing knowledge about the content of the ISP.
While the majority of users of all banks mentioned that they
know the ISP, they often could not recall a single policy. Re-
markably, most users know where to find the ISP and reported
that they use the documents.
ISP enforcing activities, such as a compulsory signature of
the ISP, is seen as an act of mistrust by many users. This was
introduced in Gamma bank. The long-standing employees re-
ported their disappointment and perceived mistrust when they
had to sign the ISP and expected legal reasons to allow the bank
to claim for compensation in case of an incident. Surpris-
ingly, IS management also doubted this practice and critically
scrutinized the benefits of this tactic.
4.4.3. Use of neutralization techniques by users
The respondents from Alpha bank indicated that their col-
leagues engage less in neutralization techniques when
compared to the answers gained from Beta and Gamma banks.
Many Beta and Gamma bank users seem to be justifying their
non-compliant behavior with neutralization techniques and
do not feel the same urgency to behave compliantly with the
ISP. It seems that fulfilling their daily work tasks is priori-
tized over acting fully compliant. Surprisingly, there are
differences between headquarter and branch users. Particu-
larly branch users reported that their neutralizing behavior was
due to a greater good, what can be categorized as the neutral-
ization technique “Appeal to Higher Loyalties”. Specifically,
branch users struggle with heavy workload and in their daily
business. Gamma bank’s branch users highlight the cus-
tomer focus, which complicates acting compliantly with ISP.
The customer satisfaction focus requires the user to act quickly
to answer inquiries, and users are often stressed because of
the daily workload. This justification refers to the neutraliza-
tion technique “defense of necessity”, which implies that the
user thinks he has no other acceptable choice.
We stand with practically one leg in prison, because our cus-
tomers would not understand why some things cannot be
done for them. You always have to balance what you can
say or do and what is not possible. User (C11), Gamma bank.
5. Discussion
ISA programs in banks can be viewed as complex preventive
controls, which need to be designed and operationalized
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carefully to overcome non-compliant IS behaviors of employ-
ees in relation to IS policies.We carefully analyzed cases of three
different banks with different designs of ISA programs. First,
our analysis was guided by different scopes of design recom-
mendations identified in the literature. Second, we analyzed
users’ responses to capture technical and behavioral implica-
tions, which represent a diverse picture across banks and
different user groups. In the following we discuss insights from
our cases and present a set of interrelated research proposi-
tions summarizing our findings.
In terms of design recommendations, Alpha bank’s ISA
program design considered almost a full range of recommen-
dations gained from literature and summarized in Tables 1 and
2. The interviews clearly indicated that this had a positive
impact in terms lowering levels of perceived IS risks, acknowl-
edging responsibilities, attributing importance to IS and building
up knowledge of ISP, as well as mentioning neutralization tech-
niques among colleagues to a lesser extent. In regard to the
cases of Beta and Gamma bank, responses from users and IS
managers indicate less comprehensive strategies were imple-
mented and less positive implications were perceived. Based
on our analysis, we conclude that a comprehensive design strat-
egy seems to be more effective, which in terms of Alpha bank
includes media richness (Shaw et al., 2009), an implementa-
tion of a full PDCA cycle (Wilson and Hash, 2003), non-
technocratic IS risk communication (Clarke et al., 2012), feedback
interventions (Eminag˘aog˘lu et al., 2009), the use of role plays
(Karjalainen et al., 2013), and enforcement of reflection and dia-
logue (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2010). This observation leads
us to our first proposition:
Proposition 1. The incorporation of a comprehensive mix of
ISA interventions in ISA programs is likely to lead to im-
proved levels of behavioral ISP compliance.
Regarding the structure of ISA programs, Alpha and Beta
bank implemented a PDCA cycle model. The qualitative data
showed that especially evaluation mechanisms are crucial for
understanding the usefulness of ISA program interventions.
Gaining this understanding on a timely basis seems to be es-
sential for on-going improvements in terms of ISA program
design choices and resulting ISA among employees. For
example, some Gamma bank users mentioned that ISA inter-
ventions are seen as expressions of self-praise of the security
department (“The security tips are a form of self-congratulation
of the security department”).Therefore, without measuring the
impact on users, the inefficacy of such self-congratulatory ISA
interventions go unnoticed and will most likely fail to prevent
IS incidents. Furthermore, respondents indicated that IS man-
agers often lacked a long-term strategy in implementing their
ISA programs, where such evaluation allows for revised plan-
ning. The strategies driving the ISA programs of Beta and
Gamma bank were less characterized by prior planning and
much more emergent in comparison with Alpha bank. The di-
rections depended on current topics quickly selected on a
quarterly basis and on the yearly approval of resources. Con-
sequently, the single ISA interventions seemed isolated and
were not well linked or coordinated in terms of a program.There
was a lack of an explicit strategy taking into account a mix of
approaches (following proposition 1) in which a risk and
feedback based understanding guides the on-going selection
of topics and methods in a management cycle. Our empirical
findings support the views from prior research on the impor-
tance of feedback mechanisms (Eminag˘aog˘lu et al., 2009) and
the usefulness of incorporating such feedback in cycle models
for managing ISA programs (Siponen, 2000; Straub and Welke,
1998; Wilson and Hash, 2003). The importance of a long-term
strategy guiding the ISA program was barely covered by pre-
vious literature and extends previous findings. We therefore
summarize as follows.
Proposition 2. The implementation of a long-term strategy al-
lowing for the controlled adjustment of an ISA program based
on careful evaluation is likely to lead to improved levels of be-
havioral ISP compliance.
Regarding how ISA programs are communicated, we iden-
tified Alpha bank’s non-technocratic two-way communication
solution as best practices example concerning their involve-
ment of users. A dedication to non-technocratic IS risk
communication was missing in the other two banks, where
users reported that the ISP and also the IS interventions are
not comprehensible enough. In particular, Gamma bank’s ISA
program interventions relied on formal and autocratic lan-
guage (“I receive some feedback that it is written too difficult,
that it is written by lawyers, and not by speech of normal
person”). Our findings provide further empirical insights comple-
menting the study of Clarke et al. (2012), which states that non-
technocratic IS risk communication is crucial to create
inclusiveness across user groups. Another successful ap-
proach to improve user involvement at Alpha bank included
feedback interventions by conducting quizzes and role-plays.
In addition, follow-up questionnaires were used as simple
means to validate the usefulness of these ISA interventions.
In contrast, Beta and Gamma bank did not implement any of
these design recommendations. These results are consistent
with the results of other current studies regarding the en-
forcement of reflection and dialogue (Albrechtsen and Hovden,
2010), use of role models and role plays (Karjalainen et al., 2013),
and feedback interventions (Eminag˘aog˘lu et al., 2009) to posi-
tively influence ISA. Accordingly, we raise another proposition.
Proposition 3. Non-technocratic two-way communication in
an ISA program is likely to lead to improved levels of behav-
ioral ISP compliance.
Banks generally neglected to customize their ISA interven-
tions (Karjalainen et al., 2013) to regional contexts,
organizational entities, and or tailor interventions to IS risks
more common among certain employee groups, and did not
consider personality profiles (Johnston et al., 2016; Kajzer et al.,
2014). However, both aspects related with differentiated IS in-
terventions seem to be important for the investigated banks.
The location of the branch was reported to be connected with
different IS requirements. IS managers mentioned that the lo-
cation of the brand can determine the likelihood or severity
of IS risks. Beta bank, for example, has a southern region more
prone to phishing attacks, while password misuse is more likely
in their country’s capital. The physical separation with users
distributed in several hundred branches is one main barrier.
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Another issue is that collecting data on user’s personality traits
would require large time investments and approval from em-
ployee representatives. Accordingly, while interviewed IS
managers found differentiation promising, they also men-
tioned that it is difficult to implement.
Our empirical analysis emphasized the salience of two
large groups of users in banks, which face different IS risks
and have different needs of information in their work areas
(headquarter vs. branch user). For example, branch users
struggle more with safely logging on and off from the com-
puters (“Passwords are an infinite theme, I personally hate
this issue”), while this is not an issue for headquarter users.
Hence, we suggest that there should be a clear differentia-
tion between these groups of employees in ISA programs
(and possibly others) according to their needs, despite the
fact that the rules of ISP are binding for all. Our research
extends current literature (Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009;
Posey et al., 2014) by calling for a more differentiated
target audience concept and, hence, we raise the following
proposition.
Proposition 4. The differentiation of target audiences (e.g. head-
quarter and branch users) in ISA programs is likely to lead to
more effective ISA interventions and consequently to im-
proved levels of behavioral ISP compliance.
While the level of knowledge of the ISP is consistently low
among users in all banks, we found that users of Alpha bank
(with a high coverage level of design recommendations) have
different perceptions about their responsibilities and duties re-
garding ISP compliance. Headquarter and branch users are not
recognizing their own responsibilities in ensuring IS and instead
assign responsibility to IT/IS personnel. This finding extends
existing IS research by providing insights into perceived IS re-
sponsibilities, which seems to differ between employee groups
(Albrechtsen, 2007; Albrechtsen and Hovden, 2009; Kolkowska,
2011; Posey et al., 2014).
Intentional violations of the banks’ ISP are usually justi-
fied by users among our cases in the form of neutralization
techniques. While ISA programs can reduce the use of neu-
tralization techniques and enhance the likelihood that those
users will follow the banks’ ISP, no case focused on commu-
nicating ISA interventions based on the prevention of
neutralization techniques (Barlow et al., 2013; Bauer and
Bernroider, 2014). Branch users are reverting mostly to “appeal
to higher loyalties” and “defense of necessity” (“We stand with
practically one leg in prison, because our customers would not
understand why some things cannot be done for them”). Both,
branch and headquarter users commonly utilize the tech-
nique “denial of injury”. This differentiation adds to previous
qualitative research on ISA (Albrechtsen, 2007; Albrechtsen and
Hovden, 2009; Posey et al., 2014). Additionally, we provide new
insights to existing research on neutralization and IS policy
compliance (Barlow et al., 2013; Bauer and Bernroider,
2017; Siponen and Vance, 2010). According to the above dif-
ferentiation proposition, we extend it by assuming that ISA
interventions, which specifically target particular neutraliza-
tion techniques of headquarter or branch users, should more
effectively tackle neutralizing behaviors. Thus, we raise the fol-
lowing final proposition.
Proposition 5. ISA programs considering user group tailored
interventions are more likely to reduce the particular neutral-
ization techniques common to the according user group.
Finally, we also distinguished between different types of ISA
programs based on dominant characteristics and classified three
different approaches: Alpha Bank implementing an interac-
tion approach, Beta Bank an incident approach, and Gamma
bank an accountability approach. The interaction approach
focuses on user involvement helped IS managers to get feed-
back about their ISA interventions and employees’ perceptions
of actual IS risks. Beta bank’s incident approach allowed users
to better conceive actual IS risks in contrast to Gamma bank’s
users, who report that they missed examples of real-world IS
incidents. While the Gamma bank’s accountability approach
has the advantage that users feel more responsible than in other
banks, the chosen ISA interventions also induced a feeling
among users of being mistrusted. Overall, every approach has
specific benefits, which could be potentially combined in a
mixed-form approach.
5.1. Implications for practice
Based on our findings, the following implications for practice
offer suggestions for the design of effective ISA programs, which
may also provide value to organizations from other indus-
tries apart from financial services. We also give illustrative
examples to specifically demonstrate how IS managers could
improve their ISA programs based on the above discussed
propositions.
In relation to proposition 1, we suggested that IS manag-
ers should implement a mix of ISA design recommendations
outlined in Table 1 and control whether users are getting in-
volved and find ISA program useful. This mix of ISA
interventions could, e.g., in terms of media richness include
innovative ISA videos visualizing IS risks and threats, which
can be today produced relatively economically or may even be
developed by users (Bauer and Frysak, 2014). In such ways, em-
ployees not consuming the information via other more
traditional channels such as emails can be reached. Another
example would be to scare users by illustrating real life stories
of IS incidents in ISA programs without applying a techno-
cratic style. For example, IS management is advised to avoid
advocating purely technical knowledge detailing rules for hard
passwords from the top (Horcher and Tejay, 2009). We noted
that IS managers, utilizing an incident approach based on
simple and engaging stories about real life IS incidents, achieved
greater user involvement. Users may even be encouraged to
share their own experiences and what they have learned from
mistakes. A good example is to expose bad password use and
reuse habits and possible adverse impacts (Florencio and Herley,
2007), which may be published in an ISA video, a blog post or
an intranet podcast.
In terms of proposition 2, we in particular point to the lack
of an evaluation mechanism in IS management preventing im-
provements of ISA programs. IS managers should introduce a
full cycle model, which should be iteratively applied such as
the commonly known PDCA cycle (Disterer, 2013; Wilson and
Hash, 2003). Our findings emphasize the importance of evalu-
ation and careful study of ISA interventions, which should be
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aligned with the needs of different user groups in aiming at
the prevention and detection of changing IS risks and threats.
The impact of ISA programs on ISA and possibly the result-
ing users’ security behavior should be measured with suitable
metrics to allow for managing the effects of each ISA inter-
vention on the different user audiences of the organization.
While there is no prescriptive set of metrics which can be gen-
erally prescribed, supporting standards or frameworks, e.g.
COBIT or ISO2700X (Sahibudin et al., 2008), can be used to guide
the selection of IS metrics. The type and focus of the inter-
vention will determine the aspect of ISA to measure. For
example, if access control habits are targeted, password crack-
ing software or sampling walk-throughs where, e.g., unattended
screens without password protection are sought, can be used
to measure levels of compliant IS behaviors (Peltier et al., 2005).
A new trend is the use of honeypots to foster the understand-
ing about how compliant or fraudulent users behave
(Christopher et al., 2017). Among banks, the costs and fre-
quency of all IS incidents are usually measured by their
operational risk departments, which can be used to indi-
rectly estimate the effectiveness of the ISA program. Some
banks evaluate IS policy compliance directly by, e.g., applying
social engineering penetration tests (Bullée et al., 2015). Usually,
penetration tests are conducted by external agencies, which
actively check users’ behavior in terms of handling fake phish-
ing mails, fake phone calls and fake artifacts such as USB sticks,
which users should not connect with their computers (Bauer
et al., 2013). The findings from Alpha bank, however, showed
that such assessment practices can be disturbing for users,
because they feel overly controlled by their employer. Alter-
natively, measurements could involve self- or peer-assessments,
either qualitatively or quantitatively (Vaughn et al., 2003).
In the context of proposition 3, feedback interventions can
be built into ISA programs to enable effective two-way com-
munication. For example, the above mentioned self-assessments
would also support user involvement and allow for feedback
in an ISA program. The feedback can also be fostered by en-
gaging in dialogs with users (e.g. by utilizing role-plays or
quizzes). In our case study, Alpha bank utilized creative ap-
proaches to enhance user’s emotional involvement in this way.
The use of role models stimulated discussions in rather in-
formal settings, e.g., during lunch time, to lower the barriers
for reflecting on information distributed earlier. This setting
fostered ISA relevant discussions among users, which then also
became more willing to conduct the quizzes. It is suggested
to design questions around main themes previously empha-
sized in other ISA program interventions to support repetitive
learning and build on prior knowledge, which is also likely to
reinforce shared knowledge and group learning (David et al.,
2016). Another example to foster two-communication is the use
of common language and user friendly non-technocratic vo-
cabulary in ISA program interventions. Our third case, Gamma
bank, revealed a set of pitfalls by showing how banks should
not communicate in this context, e.g., the dissemination of di-
rective messages highlighting that employees must stay
compliant to the ISP.This approach created irritations and mis-
understandings about the content of ISP and resulted in largely
detached users.
Propositions 4 and 5 suggest differentiated approaches in
ISA programs designs. First of all, IS management could
customize ISA programs by user groups (e.g. headquarter vs.
branch users) and by geographical areas, which are likely to
have cultural differences relevant for internalizing ISA (Tsohou
et al., 2015). Similar to target marketing approaches, IS man-
agers should first evaluate the needs and characteristics of
single user groups regarding ISP compliance. Next, they should
customize ISA interventions to more effectively address certain
groups of users. The headquarter/branch structure has some
particular implications for ISA programs such the need for cov-
ering widely distributed units. Interventions can also be tailored
to reduce particular neutralization techniques identified as
highly relevant in our context of ISP compliance in banks. Prac-
titioners should consider tackling the neutralization techniques
denial of injury, appeal to higher loyalties, and defense of ne-
cessity in their ISA programs. To mitigate the latter, e.g., user
perceptions of IS responsibilities can be targeted to balance IS
and operational pressures, which users face when conduct-
ing their daily tasks.
5.2. Implications for future research
Our findings offer many possibilities for future research in the
area of ISA program designs. Research has only begun to iden-
tify recommendations for effective structural or communicational
designs. Particularly the involvement of users seems to have an
important mediation effect, and research could explore in more
detail how involvement is reached through ISA interventions,
which should in turn foster behavioral ISP compliance. We offer
a list of propositions, which could be used to inform model de-
velopment and be tested in a quantitative survey. Further,
message-to-person congruence in ISA interventions was not ana-
lyzed through the underlying study because to our best of
knowledge no case considered this factor so far.Therefore, future
research should analyze which types of personalities are more
sensitive to certain ISA interventions or ISA program ap-
proaches in practice. In terms of structure, further research is
necessary to discover different ISA program approaches. This
study only identified ISA programs with three different foci, and
further research on the relationship or investigating a mix of
different types of ISA interventions is still needed.
Users’ ISP compliance still needs to be explored empiri-
cally in more depth in banks and other industries. In particular,
more qualitative research might focus on certain user per-
spectives. It can be expected that other industries face similar
problems as banks in enforcing ISP compliance, and the dif-
ferentiation between headquarter and branch users (or other
groups) offers an interesting area for research. Regarding the
individual level, future studies on intentional violations of banks’
ISP could expand on the three neutralization techniques: denial
of injury, appeal to higher loyalties, and defense of necessity.
Our results showed that these are highly important in the
context of banks.
The short-, mid-, and long-term effect of ISA programs on
users’ ISP compliance could be analyzed with longitudinal quan-
titative research. As we described, users’ achieved ISA is a
temporal state of mind, but ISA programs with several ISA in-
terventions over time should work toward maintaining a high
level of ISA throughout the workforce. Therefore, a longitudi-
nal study could more accurately identify effects of ISA programs
on users’ ISP compliance.
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5.3. Limitations
Several limitations have to be considered concerning our results
and interpretations. First, we have researched three banks in the
CEE region.Therefore, the data represents very specific cases and
allows unique insights into usually tightly sealed IS contexts,
which however cannot be generalized. Second, talking about se-
curity issues within the respective workplace could be biased
by social desirability and other factors. We tried to overcome re-
spondents’ social desirability answering behavior by asking users
if coworkers neutralize their ISP violations and thereby not di-
rectly asked about their own behavior. Third, the case study is
also bounded to the context, situations, and time. Generally, nar-
ratives offer a rich material from retrospective construction of
stories to illustrate insights relevant for the case.
6. Conclusion
The multiple case studies revealed that different coverage levels
of ISA program design recommendations are likely to
influence a wide area of factors related to users’ ISP compli-
ance. This calls for further research on ISA program designs
as well as on the identified factors influencing ISP compli-
ance. Structural as well as communicational design
recommendations are critical for the enforcement of two-
way communication, for which especially the use of feedback
interventions is advantageous. Overall, we recommend that
IS managers should pay more attention to a cyclic manage-
ment process, such as the PDCA cycle, to in particular
incorporate ISA program evaluation and adaptations. A high
coverage level of suggested design recommendations is likely
to improve perceptions of IS risk, responsibilities, ISP impor-
tance, and knowledge as well as a lesser use of neutralization
techniques. In detail, the best practice case of Alpha bank
showed that their interactive approach seems to be most ben-
eficial for increasing IS risk perceptions. Additionally, in
designing ISA programs, IS managers should consider a more
differentiated concept to effectively reach all users. Banks as
well as other information centric organizations should cus-
tomize their ISA programs by distinguishing between the IS
needs of user groups, in terms of headquarter and branch users.
Appendix
Table A1 – Interview statistics (all interviews face-to-face, average duration 33 minutes).
ID Role description Case Role Interview code
1 Head of information security department Alpha bank IS managers A1
2 Retail risk manager Alpha bank User A2
3 Product development manager Alpha bank User A3
4 Marketing manager Alpha bank User A4
5 Secretary Alpha bank User A5
6 Corporate risk management analyst Alpha bank User A6
7 Branch advisor Alpha bank User A7
8 Head of control systems Alpha bank User A8
9 Law operations manager Alpha bank User A9
10 Head of information security Beta bank IS managers B1
11 Head of information security Beta bank IS managers B2
12 Communication manager Beta bank User B3
13 Audit manager Beta bank User B4
14 General manager direct banking Beta bank User B5
15 Operational risk manager Beta bank IS managers B6
16 Business continuity manager Beta bank User B7
17 Non-cash transactions manager Beta bank User B8
18 Physical security manager Beta bank IS managers B9
19 Fraud prevention analyst Beta bank IS managers B10
20 Project manager Beta bank User B11
21 Assistant to chief security officer Gamma bank IS managers C1
22 Education and training coach Gamma bank IS managers C2
23 IT security manager Gamma bank IS managers C3
24 Accounting employee Gamma bank User C4
25 Branch manager Gamma bank User C5
26 Branch manager Gamma bank User C6
27 IT security and organization Gamma bank IS managers C7
28 Branch manager Gamma bank User C8
29 Advisor for corporate clients Gamma bank User C9
30 Client advisor Gamma bank User C10
31 Lawyer and system manager Gamma bank User C11
32 Client advisor Gamma bank User C12
33 Assistant to the executive board Gamma bank User C13
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